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1 .o PREFACE 
This docltnient i s  a compi la t ion  o f  hazard descr ip t ions  which 
have been i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  manned space f l i g h t  prcgranis, 
i n c l u d i n g  Mercury, Gemini , Apollo, Sky1 ab, and the Apol 1 o/ 
Soyuz Test Pro jec t .  This summary i s  intended t o  provide an 
element o f  experience r e t e n t i o n  i n  the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
hazards. I n  order t o  keep the  ca ta log  as simple and concise 
as possible,  each l i s t i n g  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  mater ia l  d e s c r i p t i v e  
o f  the  hazard o r  necessary t o  understand i t s  nature. No 
attempts have been made t o  discuss poss ib le  methods o f  
avoidance, t o  assess the  degree of r i s k  invo lved i n  a v a i l a b l e  
a l t e rna t i ves ,  o r  t o  i d e n t i f y  the s p e c i f i c  program involved. 
Such in fo rmat ion  w i l l  be made ava i l ab le  upon request t o  the 
JSC Safety D iv i s ion ,  ma i l  code NS. Recipients are encouraged 
t o  forward t o  the  same address suggested add i t ions  t o  the  
catalog. 
This issl;e o f  t h i s  ca ta log  cons t i t u tes  a complete r e v i s i o n  t o  
p rev ious ly  pub1 f shed ed i  t i ons , i n c l u d i n g  a r e v i  s i  on of format, 
and an .increase o f  approximately 30 percent i n  the  number o f  
enter ies.  
s p e c i f i c  areas t h a t  have been a l t e r e d  o r  added. 
Therefore, no attempt has been made t o  i n d i c a t e  
Addressees are requested t o  forward t h i s  ca ta log  t o  those 
persons havi ng an i n t e r e s t  i n the desi gn, f a b r i  ca t ion ,  checkout 
o r  operat ion of space f l i gh t  equipment. 
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2 .o INTRODUCTION 
2.1 GENERAL 
Man's f i r s t  landing on the moon on J u l y  20, 1969, marked 
the  cu lminat ion o f  10 years o f  i n tens i ve  e f f o r t  i n  l ea rn ing  
how t o  design, b u i l d ,  and operate space vehic les.  Dur ing 
t h i s  per iod,  most o f  the s i g n i f i c a n t  hazards associated 
w i t h  space f l i g h t  were i d e n t i f i e d  and circumvented success- 
f u l l y  by the evgineers d i r e c t l y  invo lved i n  the on-going 
programs. 
o f  the hazards t h a t  were i d e n t i f i e d  dur ing  those e a r l y  
years o f  manned space f l i g h t  and dur ing  the most recent  
Skylab and Apol lo  Soyuz programs. 
I n  the i n t e r e s t  o f  b r e v i t y ,  each l i s t i n g  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  
desc r ip t i ve  mater i  a1 necessary i n  understanding the nz ture  
o f  the hazard. 
This document i s  intended t o  increase awareness 
2.2 PURPOSE 
This  document provides cur ren t  and f u t u r e  space program 
desigr,ers , managers, and analysts w i t h  a s ing le  reference 
l i s t i n g  o f  the most s i g n i f i c a n t  hazards i d e n t i f i e d  on previous 
manned space f l i g h t  programs. This  summacy i s  o f  spec ia l  value 
t o  system sa fe ty  engineers i n  developing sa fe ty  check1 i s t s  
and otherwise t a i l o r i n g  sa fe ty  tasks t o  s p e c i f i c  systems and 
suusysteins t o  prov ide assurance t h a t  "lessons-learned" from 
p rev i  ous programs are r e t a i  ned. 
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3.0 HAZARDS CATALOG ORGAN I ZAT I ON 
In this catalog, hazards are  presented i n  nine ma,jor 
categories related to  major spacecraft subsystems or to  
overall spacecraft operations ( r e f e r  t o  Table I ) .  These 
categories are  fur ther  divided i n t o  18 subcategories which 
re la te  t o  general problem areas such as toxici ty ,  corrosion, 
vibration, e tc .  ( r e f e r  to Table I ) .  To minimize duplication, 
hazards are l i s ted  i n  the most appropriate category and sub-  
category. 
f lu ids  and gases are  l i s t e d  i n  the "fluid" major category. 
They are then divided into the most appropriate subcategory 
for easy reference. 
For example hazards pertaining i n  general t o  
TABLE 1. - HAZARDS CATALOG CATEGORIES 
MAJOR CATEGORIES SUBCATEGORIES 
Environmental 
Structural 
Mechanical 
Electrical  
F1 u i  d 
Propulsion 
Expl os i ve 
Aerodynamic 
Operational 
Configuration 
Fabri cation 
Contamination 
Toxici ty ( i  ncl udi ng  i rri tan ts )  
F1 ammabi 1 i ty  
Corros i on 
Vi bration 
Human e r ror  
Improper procedures 
Defective or unsuitable equipment 
Verification of equipment 
Handli nS of equipment 
Protection from environment 
Operational s ta tus  information 
Pressure control 
Leakage 
Over1 oads 
Transients 
4- 1 
4 .O 
4.1 
4.1.1 
4.1.2 
4.1.3 
4.1.4 
4.1.5 
4.1.6 
4.1.7 
4.1.8 
4.1.9 
4.1.10 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 
CON F I GU PAT I ON 
Failure of cabin pressure relief valve t o  relieve during 
launch  and reentry phases of f l i g h t .  
Inadequate provisions t o  prevent cabin ventilating fans 
from jamming caused by debris floating in zerogravi t y  
conditions. 
Inadvertent switch actuation because of inadequate 
marking , i nadequate guardi ng , improper spacing , or 
positioning on panels. 
The problem i s  accentuated d u r i n g  suited operations 
by the lack of a sense of feel with pressurized sui ts  
and gloves. 
Inadequate provisions t o  keep overboard dump 1 ines functional 
because of clogging or freeze-up. 
Lack of moisture protection for sensitive equipment w h i c h '  is 
mounted near plumbing l ines,  cold plates, etc.  
Sharp points  or edges t h a t  could injure crewmen or tear 
pressure sui ts  i n  the crew bay or d u r i n g  extravehicular 
ac t i  v i  ty. 
Venting of the crew bay to  space th rough  the same opening 
used t o  vent liquids or harmful gases. 
The opening may freeze and prevent pressure rel*ief 
of the crew bay. 
Lack of screens to  prevent entry of tools, hardware, or 
debris into sections of the spacecraft where interference 
w i t h  the operation of spacecraft equipment could result .  
No isolation capability for multiple pressure suits o n  a 
common pressure source to  ensure retention of a survivable 
environment in the remaining sui ts  i f  orle su i t  ruptures. 
Lack of protection aga ins t  actuation of equipment by 
involuntary movements of a sleeping crewman. 
This problem i s  accentuated i n  zerogravity by permitting 
arms and legs t o  f loat  away from couches or seats.  This 
problem i s  most cr i t ical  i n  solo operations. 
4- 2 
4.1 . l l  
4.1.12 
4.1.13 
4.1.14 
4.1.15 
4.1.16 
4.1.17 
4.1.18 
4.1.19 
4.1.20 
4.1.21 
4.1.22 
4.2 
4.2.1 
4.2.2 
Cabin pressure relief valves that are sensitive t o  and 
unprotected from debris o f  the type tha t  could reach them 
under zerogravi ty  condi t i  ons . 
No provisions for an audible alarm warnin: t o  indicate 
low or rapidly decreasi ng spacecraft cabin pressure. 
No provisions t o  prevent water penetration in the crew cabin 
during water 1 andi ng . 
Inadequate provisions t o  prevent the introduction of 
undesirable gases into the breathing gas supply systems. 
Switches and con tn l s  not protected from impact of heavy or 
rigid equipment t h a t  must be donned, worn, or moved a tou t  
i n  the crew bay. 
Deployed equipment chilled below the cabin dew point not 
protected against condensation when reintroduced to the 
cabin envi ronrrien t . 
Deployed equipment heated above touch temperature limits 
not adequately protected froin the crew and temperature 
sensitive equipment when reintroduced t o  the cabin 
envi ronmeii t . 
Inab i  l i  ty t o  r e y l a t e  cabin pressure remotely f o r  each 
compartment of the spacecraft. 
Failure t o  provide a warning indication when the spacecraft 
habi tab1 e e w i  ronment re1 i ef Val vels) and other veliti ng 
devices are not fully seated. 
Lack of protection of the crew and equipment from the release 
of shattered mater'i a1 fragments. 
Location of exhaust ports i a  proximity t o  relief valves 
may allow gas ingestion on reentry, hazardous gases may be 
drawn into the crew bay along w i t h  the outside a i r .  
Expansion of closed cell foam materials due t o  pressure change 
when such materials are used 25 cushions, equipment stowage 
pads or spacers may pwduce undesired configuration changes. 
CONTAM I NAT I OR 
Spacecraft windows and optical surfaces obscured by 
outgassi ng materi a1 s , overboard dumps, or engi ne exhaust. 
The use o f  mercury inside the spacecraft habitable 
environment without sui table protection. 
4- 3 
4.2.3 
4.2.4 
4.2.5 
4.2.6 
4.2.7 
4.2.8 
4.2.9 
Inadequate means o f  decontaminating equipment and personnel 
exposed t o  r a d i o a c t i v e  mater i  a1 s .  
Improper seai  i ng o f  pathogeni c b i  01 ogi c a l  pay1 oads . 
Lack o f  adequate p r o t e c t i v e  covers f o r  equipment containiRg 
1 enses . 
Lack o f  cau t ion  and warning sensors f - r  pathogenic b i o l o g i c a l  
equi pmen t . 
Inadequate prov is ions  f o r  prevent ing re lease o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  
mater ia ls  i n  the event o f  an accident.  
Lack o f  r a d i a t i o n  dosimeters f o r  each crewman when pcyloads 
o r  opera t iona l  environments i nvol ve p o t e n t i  a1 l y  h igh  
r a d i a t i o n  sources. 
The use of r a d i o a c t i v e  mater ia ls  f o r  i l l u m i n a t i n g  purposes 
w i t h o u t  p o s i t i v e  mcchani ca l  p r o t e c t i o n  aga ins t  abrasion, 
f 1 a k i  ng I o r  d i  r e c t  crew contact .  
4.2.10 The use of n o n l i f e  suopor t ing gas t o  purge hab i tab le  
modules w i t h o u t  p rov is ions  t o  assure adequate oxygen l e v e l s  
and gas mix ing  p r i o r  t o  crew ent ry .  
4.2.11 Use o f  d r i n k i n g  water n o t  p r o p e r l y  p u r i f i e d .  
4.2.12 Release of b ioc ide  such as potassium i o d i d e l i o d i n e  s o l u t i o n  
i n t o  h a b i t a b l e  areas o f  a spacecraf t .  
4.2.13 The use o f  water SeneraL;on/storage equipment suscept ib le  
t o  m e t a l l i c  i o n  contamination. 
4.2.14 Residuals from c leanina operat ions Fay r e a c t  w i t h  l i  thiur!,  
c h l o r i d e  when c i r c u l a t e d  through carbor! d iox ide  absorbent 
can is te rs  producing t o x i c  substances. 
S i  1 i cone rubber RTV (room temperature vu1 cani  z ing)  compounds 
which re lease a c e t i c  a c i d  dur in5  cur ing  cause corros iov t c  
incompat ib le  mater ia ls ,  such as ;cad, brass, and so lder  
4.2.15 
4.2.16 Halogen ac ids released by k,ydrolysis o f  halogens (blowing 
o r  cur ing  agents) i n  c e r t a i n  urethane foam thermal i n s u l a t i o n s  
o r  po lyes ter  p a i n t s  may corrode metals t o  which they are 
appl i ed. 
4-4 
4.2.17 
4.2.18 
4.3 
4.3.1 
4.3.2 
4.3.3 
4.3.4 
4.3.5 
4.3.6 
4.3.7 
Anaerobic thi.ctad locking compounds (such as "locti te") used 
on screws which are renioved or turned ar te r  the compounds have 
hardened may generate particulate contamination. 
t o  the b r i t t l e ,  crumbly nature of the hardened compounds. 
T h i s  i s  due 
Inadequate strength of packaging materials and package seals 
for food packages, operational supplies, e tc . ,  may allow 
bursting or leakage of contents as a result  o f  cabin pressure 
changes. 
TOXICITY 
Entry of toxic fumes i n t o  spacecraft cabin d u r i n g  reentry. 
The use of shatterable or shreddable materials i n  the 
crew bay whose particles would be in jur ious  t o  the crew. 
Includes use of paints or coatings t h a t  can flake. 
The use o f  p a i n t  or coatings which contain carbon black 
i n  the crew bay. 
Carbon black outgasses carbon monoxide which is  not 
removed by present environmental control systems. 
The use of cadmium in the crew bay. 
Cadmium outgasses toxic fumes a t  low pressure or a t  
elevated temperatures. 
Ethylene glycol, Coolanol , or other coolant f luid vapors 
i n  the cabin or suit atmosphere. 
In concentrations greater t h a n  25 t o  70 parts per 
million, these vapors produce intalerable t h r o a t ,  
eye, and nose irritation requiring emergency acti cr-1. 
e.g., use of oxygen masks and mission abort .  
Inadequate means of controlling the presence of an 
unacceptable toxic elivironrnent i n  the spacecraft. 
Lack of emergency prcvi sionr t o  Purge contaminants from 
spacecraft volumes or t o  provide emergency breathi ng 
capabi 1 i ty . 
4-5 
4.3.8 
4.3.9 
4.3.10 
4.3.11 
4.4 
4.4.1 
4.4.2 
4.4.3 
4.4.4 
4.4.5 
4.4.6 
4.4.7 
Contamination o f  spacecraft breathing gas systems w i th  
mercury. 
o f  tox i  c 
sys tems . 
Con tami na t i on 
mercury. 
Undetected bu 
c i r c u i t .  
mercwy vapor i n  
o f  packaged food 
ldup o f  carbon d 
The use o f  mercury i n  test ing and ca l ibrat ing valves, 
instruments, etc. can resu:t i n  dangerous levels 
spacecraft breathing gas 
o r  dr inking water w i th  
oxide i n  cabin o r  s u i t  
The use o f  beryl  1 i urn, beryl 1 i um oxides, o r  a1 loys containing 
more than 4 percent o f  beryl l ium inside the spacecraft 
habitable environment without sui table protection. 
F LAMMAB I L I TY 
Inadequate control o f  flamnable materials i n  oxygen r i c h  
environments. 
Sparks generated by removal o f  containers, e.g., removal 
o f  1 i t h i  urn hydroxide canisters from thei  r storage 
compartments i n  the crew bay. 
S ta t i c  charges generated f rom su i t s  and couches i n  the 
crew bay. 
Use of dichloroethane i n  spacecraft which u t i l i z e  l i t h i u m  
hydroxide for carbon dioxide control.  
Dichloroethane mixed w i th  l i t h i u m  hydroxide can 
generate acetylene which i s  h ighly flammable i n  the 
spacecraft oxygen atmosphere. 
Improper provisions f o r  the stawage o f  flamnable, explosive 
o r  gas generating materi a1 s . 
Components capable o f  causing i g n i t i o n  used i n  areas w i  t h  
flamnable vapors, l iqu ids,  o r  other c o r h s t i b l e  materials. 
Lack of adequate f i r e  detection and control devices where 
requi red. 
4-6 
4.4.8 
4.5 
4.5.1 
4.5.2 
4.5.3 
4.5.4 
4.5.5 
I n a b i l i t y  o f  enclosure containing flammable materials t o  
contain combustion t o  prevent propagation. 
PROTECTION FROM ENVIRONMENT 
Fai lure t o  provide ear protect ive devices i n  high noise 
envi rontrents. 
Exposure of crew members t o  high i n tens i t y  l i g h t .  
Use o f  s ingle pane spacecraft windows without pos i t ive 
assurance o f  pressure retent ion capabi 1 i ty i n  case o f  
fa i lure.  
Lack o f  u l t r a v i o l e t  and in f rared shielding on spacecraft 
viewing and photographic wfndows. 
Lack o f  proper crew protect ion for  handling extremely hot  o r  
extremely cold equipment. 
Hardware which has been exposed t o  space envi ronment 
for  long periods o f  time ray be extremely hot  o r  
cold, depending upon whether the hardware was exposed 
t o  d i rec t  sunl ight  o r  i n  the shade o f  the spacecraft 
o r  other objects. 
5- 1 
5 .O 
5.1 
5.1.1 
5.1.2 
5.1.3 
5.1.4 
5.1.5 
5.1.6 
5.1 .? 
5.1.8 
5.1.9 
5.1.10 
5.1 .I1 
5.1.12 
5.1.13 
5.1.14 
STRUCTURAL HAZARDS 
CON F I GU RAT I ON 
Inadequate o r  incorrect  stress analysis. 
Improper venting o f  space kehi c l e  interstage compartments 
and shrouds. 
Structural crevi:es where d2bris can become lodged i n  a way 
tha t  produces loca l  stress concentrations i n  tank skins. 
Inadequate allowance f o r  d is tor t ions and stresses resu l t i ng  
fmm thermal expansion or contraction. 
Vulnerabi 1 i ty o f  crew bay f 1 oor t o  unrecogni zed damage under 
one gravi ty  condi t i  ons because o f  wei gh t o f  people and 
equipment o r  impact o f  dropped tools. 
Damage due t o  e l a s t i c  r e c o i l  of vehicle structure under 
s t r a i n  a t  time o f  holddown release. 
Inadequate venting o f  enclosures t o  protect  against bui ldup 
o f  i n te rna l  pressure from evaporation o f  trapped moisture 
o r  outgassing during aerodynamic heating. 
Damage due t o  e l a s t i c  r e c o i l  resu l t ing from abrupt engine 
shutdown. 
Puncture o f  tanks by project ions on adjacent hardware, 
resu l t i ng  from inadequate allowance for st ructura l  
d is tor t ions . 
I n a b i l i t y  o f  equipment end component containers w i th in  the 
habitable areas o f  the spacecraft t o  withstand decomprexion 
apd recompression. 
Vacuum vent plumbing i aadequately protected from mechani cal 
damage. 
Inadequate protect ion from pyrotechni t shock effects. 
Insecurely mounted equipment w i  tnout s u f f i c i e n t  margins f o r  
operational loads, including noma1 c r  contingency landiags. 
Excessive dynallric loads i n  f l i g h t  dce t o  1o:igitudinal 
osc i l la t ions (POGO) resul t i c g  from engine thrust  variat ions. 
5-2 
5.2 
5.2.1 
5.2.2 
5.3 
5.3.1 
5.4 
5.4.1 
5.4.2 
5.4.3 
5.4.4 
FABRICATION 
Unsatisfactory bonding o f  skins on honeycomb st ructura l  
elements. 
Hydrogen embri tt lement o f  4130 o r  4340 steel  heat-treated 
above 180 thousand pounds per square inch and preloaded 
i n  tensi on. 
FLAMMABILITY 
Lack of f i r e  extinguishing agent access t o  iso la ted but 
unsealed containers , panel s , o r  racks where f 1 ammabi 1 i ty 
hazards ex i  s t. 
CORROSION 
Galvanic corrosion of structure under lead-sheathed, shaped 
charges. 
Use o f  metal couples tha t  create unacceptable galvanic 
corros i on. 
Materials o r  components adjacent t o  f l u i d  l i n e s  o r  containers 
which contain incompatible f l u ids .  
Stress corrosion resu l t i ng  from: 
a. Overtorque o r  over1 oad beyond stress corrosion 1 i m i  ts. 
b. Exposure t o  environments not anticipated i n  design. 
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6 .O 
6.1 
6.1.1 
6.1.2 
6.1.3 
6.1.4 
6.1.5 
6.1.6 
6.1.7 
6.1.8 
6.1.9 
- MECHANICAL HAZARDS 
CONFIGURATION 
Premature ini t ia t ion of sequences by false signal of stage 
or module separation caused by: 
a. Separation sensors w i t h  inadequate travel triggered 
by structural deflections. 
b. Faulty system design allowing signal to  be generated 
by malfunction of a single separation sensor. 
Lack of retention of the ends of springs t o  prevent jumping, 
jarring, or ja:nming which a l te rs  the spr ing  force 
characteristics. 
Gyros and gyro mounting brackets that  are not pos;~ively 
kes'ed to prevent interchanging gyros or installation of a 
gym i n  an incorrect orientation. 
T h i s  same hazard exists i n  the case of accelerometars 
used i n  guidance systems. 
Lack of redundant means of accompl i shi ng cri ti cal 
operation sequences, e.g. , separation o f  reentry module 
from other modules or equipment that would prevent a safe 
reentry and 1 andi ng . 
Lack of protection of nozzles and vents used in manned 
spacecraft systems from entrance o f  rain, debris , or other 
contaminants prior to  launch. 
Improper shielding of rotating elements t o  prevent damage 
resulting from exploding fragments. 
The use o f  chains, beaded links, or similar segmented 
devices w h i c h  can be broken, resulting i n  loose pieces 
floating i n  the spacecraft. 
Lack o f  tethering of locking p i n s ,  knobs , handles, protective 
caps, plugs, and similar devices which require removal d u r i n g  
f l igh t  operation. 
Cargo handling mechanisms t h a t  cannot withstand the 
propulsive forces resulting from leaking or ruptured fluid 
cargoes. 
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6.1.10 Inadequate seal rep1 acement provisions f o r  a i  r locks and 
simi l a r  mechani cal devices that  penetrate the pressure 
shel l  o f  the habitable area of the spacecraft. 
6.2 HANDLING OF EQUIPMENT 
6.2.1 Lack o f  pos i t ive mechanical lockins devices f o r  l i f t i n g  
devices and tiedowns. 
6.2.2 Lack o f  eutomatic braking or stop features on l i f t i n g  
mechanism cable drums. 
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7 .O 
7.1 
7.1 1 
7.1.2 
7.1.3 
7.1.4 
7.1.5 
7.1.6 
7.1.7 
7.1.8 
7.1.9 
7.1.10 
7.1.11 
ELECTRICAL HAZARDS 
CONFIGURATION 
Redundant paths not adequately separated. 
Failure t o  key electrical  connectors to  prlsi tively prevent 
interchanging w i t h  other accessible connectors. 
Metallic particles i n  electrical  equipment generated by 
screw threads used to attach covers or connectors. 
Inadequate means of protecting electrical  equipment from 
effects of particles Gr parts floating i n  zerogravity 
envi ronmen ts . 
Failure of the fuel cell separation system to  separate 
completely the hydrogen gas from the potable water. 
Inability t o  checkout pyrotechnic circuits a f te r  installation. 
Inadequate i so l a t ion  of pyrotechnic wir ing from other 
spacecraft w i r i n g  . 
Sharp edges t h a t  can contact unprotected electrical  wire 
insul a t i  on. 
Condensation of contaminated moisture i n  cooled parts of the 
electronic equipment. 
The crew bay atmosphere will generally be oxygen rich 
and may contain excessive moisture contaminated with 
human excretion. 
Inability o f  electronic equipment to  maintain undisturbed 
operation i n  the presence of transient supply voltage 
pulses shorter than the response time of power system 
regulators. 
Power system surges outside tolerable 1 imi ts resulting from 
equipment turn-on or off.  
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7.1.12 
7.1.13 
7.1.14 
7.1.15 
7.1.16 
7.1.17 
7.1.18 
7.1.19 
7.1.20 
7.1.21 
7.1.22 
Electrical w i r i ng  i n  contact w i th  f l u i d  l ines.  
A short c i r c u i t  from a ho t  wire t o  a grounded f l u i d  
l i n e  can burn a hole i n  the l i n e  and cause a leak, a 
gross l i n e  rupture, o r  a f i r e ,  depending on the 
pressure and the type o f  f l u i d  i n  the l i n e .  
This same hazard ex is ts  i n  the case o f  f l u i d  tanks. 
Lack o f  protect ion from damage o r  corrosion caused by 
e lec t ro l y te  leakage o r  improper venting from batter ies.  
System design t h a t  does not provide a means o f  ve r i f y i ng  
i n  p r e f l i g h t  tests  tha t  each ind iv idual  path i n  a redundant 
system i s  operational. 
Short o r  open c i r c u i t s  i n  biomedical o r  communications 
w i r i ng  ins ide pressure su i t .  
E lec t r i ca l  shock through biomedical o r  comunicatioilr 
w i r i ng  . 
E l e c t r i  cal  energy sources o r  storage devices (batter ies , 
capacitors j ins ide the pressure s u i t .  
Solder j o i n t  cracking i n  potted pr in ted c i r c u i t  board 
assembl i es , i ncl  udi ng cordwood modules . 
Wiring unprotected from damage due t o  t r a f f i c  i n  the crew 
bay during p r e f l i g h t  preparations. 
Excessive use o f  carry-on checkout equipment and need t o  
disconnect vehicle cables f o r  checkout. 
Switching o f  la tch ing relays caused by transients t o  an 
unplanned confi  gurat i  on. 
Interference o f  a t t i  tude control  j e t s  w i th  op t i ca l  s t a r  
trackers by: 
a. Solar r e f l e c t i o n  from pa r t i c l es  o r  crystals i n  j e t  
e f f l u x .  
b. Displacement o f  s t a r  image by re f rac t i an  o f  l i g h t  i n  
j e t  e f f l u x .  
c. Corona induced by ionized j e t  gas impinging on 
unpressuri zed electronics o f  s t a r  tracker. 
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7.1.23 
7.1.24 
7.1.25 
7.1.26 
7.1.27 
7.1.28 
7.1.29 
7.1.30 
7.1.31 
7.1.32 
7.1.33 
7.1.34 
7.1.35 
7.1.36 
Equipment no t  designed t o  surv ive momentary power 
in te r rup t ions .  
Ldck o f  p ro tec t ion  f o r  pyrotechnic c i r c u i t s  from t rans ients  
generated i n  the space vehic le  e l e c t r i c a l  power system. 
Shared f i r i n g  contro l  c i r c u i t r y  %hat requires c r i t i c a l  
systems t o  be armed during periods when they are not t o  
be used, i.e., wh i le  the f i r i n g  contro l  c i r c u i t r y  i s  
energized t o  f i r e  other systems. 
Fa i lu re  t o  remove shor t ing devices such as springs and c l i p s  
used i n  connectors, p r i o r  t o  connector use. 
Inadequate marking o f  mating plugs and wires t o  i nd i ca te  
cor rec t  mating connections o r  termination points .  
Fa i lu re  t o  use female connectors a t  sources o f  power. 
So l i d  w i re  (s ing le  s t r a i d )  used i n  locat ions where i t  may 
be subjected t o  f lex ing .  
E l e c t r i c a l  connector and cable i n s t a l l a t i o n s  w i t h  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  length, and a c c e s s i b i l i t y  t o  
permit disconnection and reconnection w i thout  damage t o  
w i  r i  ng o r  connectors. 
Fa i lu re  t o  ground o r  i nsu la te  contro l  shafts, knobs, 
handles, o r  levers t o  preclude personnel shock o r  burn. 
Power c i r c u i t s  and s ignal  c i r c u i t s  routed through the same 
connector caus i ng e 1 ec t romag ne t i c i n t e  rf eren ce . 
Fa i lu re  t o  remove e l e c t r i c a l  power froin e l e c t r i c a l  
connectors during engagement/di sengagement operations . 
Fa i lu re  t o  hermet ica l ly  seal relays, inc lud ing  motor 
s t a r t  relays, l eve l  sensing devices, switches, cam 
contacts, comnutators, etc., which can produce an 
e l e c t r i c a l  arc. 
Lack o f  consideration f o r  potent1 a1 corona discharge i n  
h igh voltage o r  h igh frequency c i r c u i t s .  
Presence of contaminants o r  offgassing mater ia ls  from motor 
switches, relays etc. 
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7.1.37 
7.1.38 
7.1.39 
7.1.40 
7.1.41 
7.1.42 
7.1.43 
7.1.44 
7.1.45 
7.1.46 
7.1.47 
7.1.48 
7.1.49 
7.1.50 
7.1.51 
7.1.52 
Fa i l u re  t o  passivate s o l i d  s t a t e  devices. 
Engine k i l l  c i r c u i t r y  l i v e  a f t e r  holddown release. 
Fa i l u re  t o  deadface o r  otherwise p ro tec t  against  shorts i n  
c i r c u i t s  in te r rup ted  by g u i l l o t i n e  cu t te rs .  
Inadequate requirements f o r  redundant re1 ays i n  c r i t i c a l  
c i  r c u i  t s  . 
Para1 l e 1  i ng re1 ay contacts w i  thout  p r o t e c t i  ng against  , 
o r  el i tn inat ing,  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  one s e t  o f  contar ts  
may mate i n  the new p o s i t i o n  before the o ther  s e t  has 
broken from the o l d  pos i t i on .  
Lack o f  prov is ions f o r  bleeder res i s to rs  t o  discharge 
capaci tors when equipmmt i s  deenergi zed. 
Inadequate means o f  i s o l a t i n g  instrumentat ion c i r c u i t r y  
from operat ing system c i r c u i t r y .  
Improper i s o l a t i o n  o f  primary and redundant system c i r c u i t s .  
Lack o f  p ro tec t ion  agai ns t i nadvertent operat i  on o f  c i  r c u i  t 
breakers o r  switches used t o  cont ro l  pyrotechnic devices 
and other  c i r c u i t r y  intended f o r  emergency purposes. 
Fa i l u re  o f  the  b u i l t - i n  t e s t  equipment t o  f a i l  safe. 
Improper p r o t e c t i  on o f  c r i t i c a l  c i  r c u i  t s  from e l  e c t r i  ca l  
sho r t  c i r c u i t s  a t  connectors. 
I n te rna l  shorts, overheating, and explosion o f  ba t te r ies .  
I n a b i l i t y  o f  ba t te r i es  t o  accept mu1 t i p l e  recharges wi thout  
dendr i te  growth and i n t e r n a l  shorts. 
Improper thermal i s o l a t i o n  between ba t te r ies .  
Inadequate prov is ions f o r  ba t te ry  heat d iss ipa t ion .  
Fa i l u re  t o  provide a l l  hermet ica l l y  sealed ba t te r i es  
with blowout plugs f o r  pressure r e l i e f .  
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7.1.53 Ejection of battery electrolyte from batteries. 
7.1.54 
7.1.55 
Batteries vented in to  the hab i t ab le  areas of the spacecraft 
without adequate atmospheric mixing .  
The existence of unintended electrical  current paths (Sneak 
Circuits) which may lead t o  unplanned system activation w i t h  
a hidden cause and effect  relationship. 
7.2 FABRI CAT I ON 
7.2.1 U1 trasoni c cleaning of assembled ci rcui t boards containing 
trans i s tors. 
Internal parts of some transistors are subject t o  
resonant response and fatigue damage a t  some 
frequencies used in ultrasonic cleaners. 
7.2.2 
7.2.3 
7.2.4 
7.2.5 
7.2.6 
7.2.7 
7.2.8 
Soldering of electronic parts to c i rcui t  boards i n  
cordwood mGdul es pri or t o  potting between the ci rcui t 
boards. 
Expansion and contraction of p o t t i n g  during cure can 
damage solder cmnecti ons. 
Stresses on glass diodes from excessive conformal coating . 
Use o f  long screws t h a t  penetrate black boxes and damage 
i nternal wi ring or components. 
Inadequate s t ress  relief of soldered connections. 
Physical separation and support of un insu l  ated w i  res or 
electronic parts i n  components not sufficient to  ensure 
against contact under sustained gravity force, v i  brati on, 
o r  structural di  s to r t i  on. 
Use of swaged eyelets (without soldering or welding) to 
form an electrical  connection between conductors. 
Polystyrene parts on circui t  boards that are t o  be coated w i t h  
polyurethane conformal coatings. 
The solvents used i n  polyurethane conformal coatings 
may attack and dissolve polystyrene parts. 
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7.2.9 
7.3 
7.3.1 
7.4 
7.4.1 
7.4.2 
7.4.3 
7.5 
7.5.1 
7.5.2 
7.5.3 
Appl icat ion o f  excessive torque dur ing i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  
stud-nioun ted semi conductors. 
Some stud-mounted semi conductors w i  11 t o l e r a t e  on ly  
very low i n s t a l l a t i o n  torques (on the order o f  10 
Inch-ounces) wi thout  r i s k  o f  hermetic seal f a i l u r e .  
TOXICITY 
Po lyv iny l  c h l w i d e  used as w i re  i nsu la t i on .  
FLAMMAB I L I TY 
The use o f  organic pigments i n  Te f lon  w i re  insu la t ion .  
The add i t ion  o f  some organic pigments w i l l  make Tef lon 
i nsu l  a t i  on burn i n  envi ronments where i t would normal l y  
be nonflammable. 
Inadequate separat ion o f  e l e c t r i c a l  and heat producing components 
from oxygen sys terns. 
Use o f  ethylene g lyco l  no t  i n h i b i t e d  w i t h  Benzotriazole i n  
p rox imi ty  t o  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t r y  containing s i l v e r  o r  s i l v e r -  
coated copper. 
CORROSION 
Use o f  sulphur-containing o r  sulphur-coated mater ia ls  i n  c lose 
prox imi ty  t o  e l e c t r i c a l  contacts. 
Use o f  "Lock t i te "  i n  appl icat ions where i t  can come i n  contact  
w i t h  magnetic tape. 
"Lockt i  te"  contains cherni ca l  s whi ch damage the i ron 
oxide coat ing o f  magnctic tape. 
Ingest ion o f  moisture and s a l t s  from ambient atmosphere 
i n t o  unsealed components cooled t o  cryogenic temperatures. 
Cooling o f  components t o  very low temperatures reduce: 
i n t e r n a l  pressure and may cause external  a i r  t o  be 
drawn i n  i f  the component i s  no t  hermet ica l ly  sealed. 
This breath ing ac t ion  has caused in te rna l  Contamination 
and corros icn o f  e l e c t r i c a l  equipment i n  seacoast 
atmospheres. 
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7.5.4 
7.6 
7.6.1 
7.6.2 
7.6.3 
7.7 
7.7.1 
Galvanic corrosion products creating a conducting path 
between normally open switch contacts. Swi tch contacts not 
adequately protected from exposure t o  moisture or moist 
a i r .  I 
VI BRAT I ON 
Failure of relays, qualified under launch and boost 
conditions, t o  operate under quiescent conditions (e.g., 
during vehicle coast) due t o  f r ic t ion  introduced t o  prevent 
inadvertent actuation by vibration. 
Improper operation of relays during vibration as a result o f :  
a. Changes in  mounting configuration subsequent t o  
qual i i i  cati  on tests . 
b. Failure t o  orient sensit ive axis t o  minimize effects  o f  
v i  brati  on. 
c.  Failure t o  orient reducaant relays along orthogonal axes. 
Use of relays, switches, c i rcu i t  breakers, or other current 
environmental conditions resulting from strucutral  or  acoustic 
shock generated by fir ing of pyrotechnic devices. 
nterrupti ng  devi ces which are n o t  qual i fied fo r  local 
These shocks have been kncwn to cause fracture 
of the “lead t o  chip” bonds i n  transistors.  Shock 
spectrums peaking as h i g h  as 8500 g’s  a t  8030 hertz 
have been noted. 
DEFECTIVE OR UNSUITABLE EQUIPMENT 
Improper application or  inadequate screening r,f wet slug 
tantal  um capaci tors. 
These capacitors have a tendency t o  discharge 
prematurely on the f i r s t  cycle a f t e r  a long stand 
period. This character is t ic  makes them unsuitable 
fo r  time-delay devices where early tineout would be 
undesi rable. 
They are general ly  very sensi ti ve t o  polari ty reversal. 
As l i t t l e  as 0.5 coulomb of charge mming i n  the 
reverse direction may produce suff ic ient  electroplating 
o f  silver onto the anode to  degrade performance. 
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7.7.2 
7.7.3 
7.7.4 
7.7.5 
7.8 
7.8.1 
7.8.2 
1.8.3 
They are prone t o  progressive e l e c t r o l y t i c  leakage 
through seals which i s  pa r t i cu la r l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
detect i n  the i nc ip ien t  stage. 
Inadvertent use o f  counterfei t  e lectronic parts. 
Solder t a l l s  o r  weld splash i n  t ransistors and relays. 
Solder b a l l s  o r  wire whiskers larger than the gap between 
contacts i n  normally open momentary-contact switches. 
The r i s k  o f  inadvertent c i r c u i t  actuation i s  greatest 
under zerogravi ty o r  v ibratory conditions. 
The r i s k  o f  e lec t r i ca l  f i e l d  a t t rac t i on  o f  large s ing le 
solder b a l l s  o r  grcups o f  small solder b a l l s  t o  contact 
points under zerogravi t y  condi t i ons i s undetermi ned. 
Insuf f ic ient  clearance between moving switch contacts and 
a grounded switch case o r  swi tch-operati ng mechanism. 
E las t i c  overshoot o f  the contact fo l lowing switch 
toggle actuation t o  open the c i r c u i t ,  o r  motion o f  the 
contact due t o  v ibrat ion or physical shock, can cause 
..dmentary short c i r c u i t i n g  o f  the contact t o  ground. 
This type o f  very short duration c i r c u i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  detect during regular spacecraft checkout tests. 
PROTECTION FROM ENVIRONMENT 
Cirona and arcing due to: 
a .  LEakage o f  sea:ed pressurized components. 
b. 
c. 
Inadvertent premature turn-on o f  equipment. 
Outgassing more pro1 mged than an t i  cipated. 
Structural f a i l u r e  o f  spacecraft ccntainers during changes i n  
atmospheric pressure. 
I nsu f f i c i en t  protection against harmful environmental ( s a l t  
water) intrusions i n t o  e l e c t r i c a l  systems and power supplies 
used f o r  pos tl andi ng survi Val and recovery. 
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7.8.4 
7.8.5 
7.8.6 
7.8.7 
7.8.8 
7.8.9 
7.8.10 
7.9 
7.9.1 
Water intrusion i n t o  electrical  connectors from: 
a. Nighttime condensation. 
b. Cooling of connectors imide  a space vehicle to 
temperatures below the dewpoint of the inter ior  
atmusphere as a result of heat conduction through 
copper cables extending t o  a colder environment 
outside the vehicle. 
Improper protection of magnetic 1 atching valves from 
degradation of latching force by contaminants carried to  the 
pole faces by internal f l u i d  flow. 
High resistance coating deposited on electrical  contacts 
from outgassed products of potting compound as a resQlt of 
elevated temperatures or low pressures. 
Decrease of moist environment insulation resistance i n  
electrical  components a f te r  coating w i t h  "Ladi cote" for 
f l m a b i  1 i ty protection. 
Arrangement of leads or electronic parts which does nQt  
provide rel ief  of strain caused by thermal expansion and 
con t racti on. 
Resistance changes i n  metal film resistors caused by 
electrostati  c fields. 
Resistance changes up to  6 percent were measured on 
precision resistors that  had been shipped loosely 
packed i n  plastic envelopes. Similar resistance 
changes have been produced by subjecting new resistors 
t o  e lectrostat ic  fields of 50,000 volts for  30 seconds. 
Other characteristics of the resistors were unaffected. 
Susceptibility of electronic item2 other than t h i n  
film resistors t o  damage by similar electrostatic 
f i el ds i s undetermi ned . 
Inadequate protection of system from the effects of 
1 i g h t n i n g  . 
OPE RAT I ON AL STATUS IN FORMAT I ON 
Improper rotational speed o f  guidance system gyros a t  
launch vehicle l i f t -off  or start of spacecraft engine 
i n  o rb i t .  
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7.9.2 
7.9.3 
7.9.4 
7.10 
7.10.1 
7.10.2 
7.10.3 
7.10.4 
7.10.5 
7.10.6 
Powering-up systems w i th  latching relays i n  unknown 
positions. 
Meters o r  reasurement systems supplying c r i t i c a l  operating 
information tnat  can f a i l  w i  thcut giv ing an imnediate 
ind icat ion tha t  a f a i l u r e  has occurred. 
Capabil i ty t o  provide c o n f l i c t i n g  commands from ground 
and f l i g h t  control.  
OVERLOADS 
C i r c u i t  breakers too large o r  too slow-acting t.o protect  
wiring. 
Flammable pot t ing i n  e l e c t r i c a l  connectors. 
C i r c u i t  breakers and switches w i th  flamnable cases o r  
operating parts, used i n  an ovgen-enri ched envi ronment . 
Contacts and pins i n  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t s  t h a t  w i l l  fuse 
o r  weld w i th in  the current/time l i m i t s  permitted by current 
l i m i t i n g  o r  c i r c u i t  protect ion devices. 
Fai lure t o  provide current overload devices f o r  current 
carrying conductors connected t o  f 1 i ght hardware. 
ca i lure o f  c i r c u i t  breakers t o  t r i p  and protect  the 
c i  r cu i  t. 
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8.0 
8.1 
8.1.1 
8.1.2 
8.1.3 
8.1.4 
8.1.5 
FLUID MZARDS 
CONFI GURAT I ON 
Freezing o f  f l u i d  l ines inadeqcately protected from cryogenic 
f l u i d s  o r  exposure t o  space. 
Reverse i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  f l u i d  l i n e  components (such as check 
valves) whose proper func t i  oni ng i s  dependent on d i  r e c t i  on 
o f  flow. 
Inabi 1 i ty t o  remove dangercus f l u i d s  remotely and rap id ly  
from the vehicle during emergency back-out from a planned 
operation. 
Inadequate provisions for  maintaining separation o f  coolant 
and e l e c t r i c a l  components i n  coolant pumps. 
Inadequate protect ion c f  pressure-sensi t i ve components 
against damage from in ter rupt io f i  o r  f luctuat ions o f  supply 
pressure. 
8.1.6 Lack o f  a pos i t i ve  means of assuring tha t  removal o f  
propellant loading l i nes  w i l l  not resu l t  i n  backflow of 
propellant through the f i l l  port.  
Systems o r  operations tha t  cannot survive should a s ingle 
valve f a i l  t o  open o r  close on command. 
8.1.7 
8.1.8 Location of drain valves a t  other than low points i n  f l u i d  
sys terns. 
8.1.9 Undesired spacecraft motions resu l t i ng  from d i rect ional  
venting o f  onboard gas o r  l i qu id .  
8.1.10 
8.1 .ll 
Loss o f  system operating f l u i d  through leakage o r  rupture o f  
a transducer sensing element. 
Propel 1 ant tanks con t a i  n i  ng t o x i  c f 1 u i  ds mounted where they 
are vulnerable t o  crushing during landing impact. 
8.1.12 Soft-seat hand valves upstream o f  regul ators o r  other 
contamination sensi t ive components i n  f l u i d  systems. 
8.1.13 Tank f i l l  ports not accessible from outside the vehicle. 
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8.1.14 
8.1.15 
8.1.16 
8.1.17 
8.1.18 
8.1.19 
8.1.20 
Inadequate provisions f o r  containment and removal o f  
dangerous f l u i d s  released i n  s p i i l s ,  leaks, o r  sprays 
occurring a t  vehicle tank f i l l  ports. 
Valve configurations tha t  w i l l  release propellants o r  
other damaging f l u i d s  i n t o  unprepared areas i f  the 
e l e c t r i c a l  power o r  gas pressure supplied t o  the valves 
i s  interrupted. 
Even when the f l u i d  does not escape i n t o  unprepared 
areas, rap id unpl anned and uncontrol 1 ed dumping can 
be hazardous since the ul lage gas flow rate may be 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  prevent tank implosion under 
atmospheric pressure. 
Cryogenic helium-to-fuel heat exchangers tha t  can freeze 
a f t e r  engine shutdown occurs leaviny fu,?l trapped i n  l i n e s  
between heat exchanger and engi ne valves . 
Manually operated shutof f  valves tha t  can be rendered 
inaccessible by a downstream l i n e  rupture. 
Eccentr ical ly p i  voted b u t t e r f l y  valves separated from 
pressurized l i q u i d  i n  a tank o r  l i n e  by a gas trap. 
When the valve s ta r t s  t o  open the gas flows very 
rap id ly  throggh the p a r t i a l l y  opened valve. The 
l i q u i d  fol lowing the gas i s  accelerated t o  high 
ve loc i ty  and may reach the b u t t e r f l y  long before i t  
+s f u l l y  opened. I f  the b u t t e r f l y  i s  eccentr ical ly 
pivoted t o  u t i l i z e  l i q u i d  pressure as an a id  t o  
closing i t  o r  holding i t  closed, the impinging high 
ve loc i ty  l i q u i d  stream can slam i t  closed and generate 
water-hammer forces capable o f  ruptur ing the piping. 
The s i t ua t i on  i s  compounded i f  the l i q u i d  i s  
cryogenic. The rapid reduction i n  pressure as the 
gas escapes through the valve and the r e l a t i v e l y  w a r m  
piping i n  the gas t rap cause f lash b o i l i n g  and 
v io len t  pressure surges i n  the 1iql;id approaching the 
Val ve . 
Inadequate protection o f  1 i nes against damage from mechani cal  
stress and vibrat ion.  
Fuel , oxidizer, and propellant l i nes  routed through Inhabited 
areas o f  the spacecraft. 
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8.1.21 
a.1.22 
8.1.23 
8.1.24 
8.1.25 
8.2 
8.2.1 
8.2.2 
8.2.3 
8.2.4 
8.2.5 
8.3 
8.3.1 
8.3.2 
8,3 .3  
Relief ports and vent lines located where escaping liquids 
or gases will be hazardous to personnel or equipment 
during f 1 i g h t  or  ground operations . 
Shutoff valves installed i n  series with relief valves 
without another positive relief device installed in 
para1 le1 . 
Manual ly operated valves used to  bypass pressure regulators 
or flow control devices. 
System connectors not keyed or sized so t h a t  i t  i s  
impossible t o  connect incompatible gases, fluids, or 
pressure levels. 
Fluid systems with inadequate provisions fcr s h u t t i n g  off 
flow t o  sections o f  the system which arl- susceptible to 
damage or 1 eakage . 
FABRICATION 
Failure of brazed joints due t o  inadequate cmtrol of the 
brat i  ng process. 
Failure t o  make radiographic inspections of pressure 
vessels after proof tests. 
Failure/leakage o f  "B" nuts due t o  improper installation. 
Use of dye penetrant not liquid oxygen compatible in 
checking liquid oxygen system valves. 
Fluid systems packings should be compatible w i t h  the system 
fluid, even when used as secondary seals. On a Skylab 
Mission, butyl rubber secondary seals leaked when contacted 
by nitrogen tetroxide after failure of the metal-to-metal 
primary seal. 
CONTAMINATION 
Orifices, close tolerance valves and contamination-sensi t i v e  
equipment in fluid systems not adequately protected by 
f i 1 ters , 
Contamination of spacecraft fluid systems due t o  inadequate 
analysis end filtering o f  fluids immediately prior t o  
1 oadi ng in t o  spacecraft . 
Contamination introduced by momentary reversal of flow 
(e.g. during chamber pressure surge in a hard start of 
an engine) with no f i l t e r  downstream of a device sensitive 
t o  con tami nati on, 
8- 4 
8.3.4 
8.3.5 
8.4 
8.4.1 
8.4.2 
8.5 
8.5.1 
8.5.2 
8.5.3 
8.5.4 
8.5.5 
8.5.6 
8.5.7 
Lack o f  recognit ion tha t  o r b i t a l  operation o f  f l u i d  systems 
imposes increased demands on f i l t e r s  t o  dispose o f  debris 
that i n  ground operations i s  normally separated out and 
held i n  sumps by gravi tat ional  forces. 
Inadequate protect ion o f  plumbing systems from introduct ion 
o f  contamination when opened for repairs o r  replacement o f  
components. 
Especi a1 l y  c r i  ti ca? when the system i s  opened between 
a contamination sensi t ive element and i t s  protect ive 
f i l t e r .  
TOXI  CITY 
Circulat ion o r  storage o f  t o x i c  f l u i d s  w i th in  the crew 
bay. 
Bacter ia l  t ransfer from waste water system t o  dr inking 
water. 
The use o f  conventional valves t o  separate waste 
and potable water systems does not provide adequate 
insurance against bacter ia l  migration i n t o  the 
dr inking water. 
FLAMMABILITY 
Exposure o f  t i tanium t o  l i q u i d  oxygen o r  high pressure 
gaseous oxygen. 
Use o f  solder j o i n t s  and alminum tubing i n  spacecraft 
oxygen l i nes  . 
Use o f  incompatible materials i n  l i q u i d  o r  high-pressure 
gaseous oxygen sys terns. 
S ta t i c  charge generation i n  flowing f l u i d  systems. 
Presence o f  i g n i  t i c 1  sources i n  the v i c i n i t y  o f  propel 1 ant 
sys tem vents . 
Inadvertent interchange o f  ident ica l  fue l  and oxidizer 
components w i  thout appropri ate cleaning . 
Explosive reaction o f  ethylene glycol on contact w i th  
n i  trogen tetroxide. 
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8.5.8 
8.5.9 
Use o f  hot-wire sensors i n  hydrogen system. 
Nylon seats i n  b a l l  valves used i n  h i  h pressure (1800 
t o  4000 pounds per square inch, gauge 9 systems. 
Such devices have been found t o  burn i n  a i r  systems 
a t  temperatures developed by compression o f  a i r .  
8.5.10 
0.6 CORROSION 
Use o f  flammable f l u ids  as cool ing agents. 
8.6.1 Inadequate removal o f  l ub r i ca t i ng  f l u i d  used i n  the 
drawing process from A l S l  316 stainless s tee l  tubing 
p r i  or t o  anneal i ng . 
During annealing, carbon i n  the f l u i d  stimulates 
formation o f  carbides r i c h  i n  chromium. This 
process depletes the chromium i n  the adjacent metal 
t o  the point  where intergranular corrosion occurs. 
8.6.2 
8.6.3 
8.6.4 
8.6.5 
8.6.6 
8.7 
8.7.1 
8.7.2 
Inadequate removal o f  p i c k l i n g  acid used t o  clean tubing 
a f t e r  anneal i ng  . 
The remaining acid attacks the metal and may cause 
intergranular corrosion during storage o f  the tubing 
p r i o r  t o  use. 
Corrosion i n  potable water systems due t o  chlor ine used 
f o r  water s t e r i  1 i zation. 
Chemical react ion between cool ing f l u i d s  and materials 
used t o  contain and control  the f low o f  the f l u i d  w i t h i n  
the cooling system. 
Reduction i n  strength o f  t i tanium resu l t i ng  from exposure 
t o  f l u i d s  not v e r i f i e d  t o  be fre2 from adverse stress 
corrosion e f fec ts  on ti tan i  um. 
T i  tanium exposed t o  hydraul i c f 1 u i  ds a t  temperatures above 
300-degrees Fahrenheit i s  subject t o  hydrogen enibri ttlement. 
OPERATIONAL STATUS INFORMAT 1 ON 
Premature deplet ion o f  propulsion o r  a t t i  tude control  
capabi 1 i ty not detected by propel 1 ant gaging system. 
Gas temperature control sensors located i n  a gas stream 
carrying condensed l i q u i d  droplets a t  terogravi ty. 
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8.7.3 
8.7.4 
8.7.5 
8.8 
8.8 1 
8.8.2 
8.8.3 
8.8.4 
8.8.5 
8.8.6 
8.8.7 
The flow pattern of the liquid, and hence the 
evaporative cooling of the sensor may differ  
significantly from that  established i n  qualification 
tests or  calibrations a t  one gravity. 
Limited life/limited cycle items which require periodic 
actions such as inspecti on, recharge, rep1 acement, etc.  , 
not  identified on tracking and action 1;sts. 
Limited life/limited cycle items installed so t h a t  time 
acti on cannot be accompl i shed. 
Lack o f  stringent procedures for monitoring limited l i f e /  
limited cycle sensitive equipment. 
PRESSURE CONTROL 
Pressure rel ief  valves and flow l i m i t i n g  devices not sized 
t o  protzct against a fai led-open regulator. 
Pressure drop i n  ducting downstream of pressure relief 
valves. 
Lack of adequate pressure relief capability i n  sections of 
plumbing where cryogenics or hydrogen peroxide can be 
trapped. 
Differenti a1 pressure gages w i  thout pressure re1 ief provisions 
to  prevent case rupture i f  high and low pressure connections 
are inadvertently reversed. 
The hazard i s  greatest when high and low pressure 
connections are identical i n  size and type o f  thread. 
Unvented enclosures containing pressure sources or lines 
t h a t  could, through leakage, build up internal pressure i n  
the enclosure. 
Bends i n  exhaust liries downstream of pressure relief vents 
i n  h i g h  pressure systems. 
Bends tend t o  straighten on venting. 
Regulator shutoff valves not qualified for extremes of 
temperature that can be reached as a consequence of the  
flow th rough  a fai led-open regulator. 
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8.8.8 Failure t o  limit pressurant gas flow rate to  the maximum 
requi red under worst case operati ng condi t i  ons. 
8.8.9 Overpressuri tation o f  spacecraft systems by ground support 
equipment not  provided with adequate pressure limiting or 
pressure relief devi ces. 
8.9 LEAKAGE 
8.9.1 Inadequate protection against damage from leaks or  spi 11 s 
incident t o  the loading of fluids aboard the vehicle. 
8.9.2 Seal and O-ring leakage due t o  aging or cold flow. 
9- 1 
9 .o 
9.1 
9.1.1 
9.1.2 
9.1.3 
9.1.4 
9.1.5 
9.2 
9.2.1 
9.2.2 
_PROPULSION HAZARDS 
CONF IGURAT ION 
Engine hard s t a r t  ( t ransient overpressure) due t o  fue l  lead 
(early i n j e c t i c n  o f  fue l  r e l a t i v e  t o  oxidizer) .  
Hypergol i c propel 1 ants separated by a single we1 d. 
Inadequate protect ion o f  propel 1 ant valves from damage by 
heat soak-back from the thrust  chambers. 
Metai-to-metal rubbing i n  l i q u i d  oxygen pumps. 
Combustion i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  rocket engines. 
CONTAMINATION 
Clogging o f  n i  trogeQ tetroxide i n j e c t o r  feedlines i n  
a t t i t ude  control engines caused t y  n i t r i c  acid formed 
a f t e r  exposure t o  atmospheric humidity i n  p r e f l i g h t  
ground t i  r ings . 
Engine explosion due t o  alcohol f l ush  contamination c f  
hypergolic propel 1 ants. 
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10.0 
10.1 
10.1.1 
10.1.2 
10.1.3 
10.1.4 
10.1.5 
10.1.6 
10.1.7 
10.1.8 
10.1.9 
10.1.10 
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS 
CON F I GbRAT 1 ON 
Improper rou t i ng  , hand1 i ng , support, and terminat ing o f  
explosive t ra ins .  
Inadequate pro tec t ion  o f  power supplies from shor t  c i r c u i t s  
i n  f i r e d  pyrotechni c devi ces . 
Fa i l u re  t o  design and pack parachute ree f i ng  l i n e  cu t te rs  
proper ly  t o  wi thstand snatch loads imposed by lanyards. 
Lack o f  p ro tec t i ve  devices on the ho t  s ide o f  i nd i v idua l  
pyrotechni c devi ces t o  ensure f i  r i n g  o f  o ther  pyrotechni cs 
t h a t  are i n  p a r a l l e l  w i t h  one whose ho t  s ide shor ts  t o  ground 
a f t e r  f i r i n g .  
I n s u f f i c i e n t  o r  unsat is factory  redundancy i n  h o t  br idge 
w i  r e  pyrotechnic i n i  ti ators  . 
I n i t i a t o r s  w i t h  dual br idge wires have been found t o  
be sensi ti ve t o  d i  P feren t i  a1 t o  e l e c t r i  ca l  po ten t i  a1 
between the bridgewires. 
Explosive charge i n  g u i l l o t i n e  and tension t i e  cu t te rs  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  sever w i re  bundle. 
Charge requirements are sens i t i ve  t o  bundle p o s i t i o n  
and have been found t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  greater  when 
the bundle i s  pu l l ed  against  the blade than when i t  
i s  l y i n g  f l a t  on the anvi 1. 
Hygroscopic mater i  a1 s i n  c lose prox imi ty  t o  explosives o r  
f i  r i n g  c i  r c u i  t s .  
Pyrotechnic devi ces no t  adequately designed t o  contain 
fragments and b l a s t  from the explosion. 
Damage t o  one l e g  o f  an explosive t r a i n  by b l a s t  from an 
adjacent redundant l e t  i n i t i a t e d  simultaneously bu t  
propagating more rap id ly .  
I g n i t i o n  through the nozzle o f  m u l t i p l e  s o l i d  p rope l l an t  
rocket  systems t h a t  may permi t  the b l a s t  from the f i r s t  
rocket  i g n i t e d  t o  destroy w i r i n g  and prevent s u f f i c i e n t  
e l e c t r i  ca l  f i  ri ilg energy from reachi ng the remai n i  ng 
rockets. 
10-2 
10.1 . l l  
10.1.12 
10.1.13 
10.1.14 
10.1.15 
10.2 
10.2.1 
10.2.2 
10.2.3 
10.2.4 
Deformation of shaped charge l iners caused by pressure from 
off gassing of explosive core materials. 
Degradation of lead jacket on explosive trains caused by 
incompatibility w i t h  bonding agents, solvents, or volatiles 
released duri ng curi ng . 
Desensitization of explosive materi3ls by residuals of solvents 
used i n cleaning operations . 
Inability t o  disarm propellant dispersion (destruct) systems 
af te r  they have served their  purpose, on stages or modules 
t h a t  are to  remain i n  close proximity t o  the spacecraft or 
which will be recovered for future use or ishich may terminate 
their f l igh t  i n  an inhabited area. 
Explosives made more sensitive by chemical reactions between 
explosives and their  containers. (Lead azide + water + s i lver  
or cop er charge holder = extremely sensitive silver or copper 
a t i  de. Y 
VERIFICATION OF EQUIFNENT 
Incomplete identification, manufacturing and storage 
h i  story, and description of pyrotechni c devi ces. 
Pyrotechni c devi ces n o t  verified by neutron radiograph 
inspection and/or X-ray t o  have proper placement and density 
of explosive materials and piece parts. 
Lack of provisions for  conspicuous identification by color 
code of a l l  pyrotechnic units n o t  intended for f l igh t  
use. 
Units in this category include iner t  units, rejected 
f l igh t  operhtional units, and special purpose 
units such as nonstandard charge units, test and 
development units, simulators, and charged training 
units. 
Uncontrolled or insufficiently verified t e s t  techniques 
used to demonstrate insensitivity of pyrotechnic devices 
t o  ini t ia t ion by s t a t i c  charges. 
By creating a conducting or low resistance p a t h  
through the explosive mix, these tes t s  can permanently 
lwer the resistance of the device t o  ini t ia t ion by 
subsequent s t a t i c  charges. 
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10.3 
10.3.1 
10.3.2 
10.4 
10.4.1 
10.4.2 
10.4.3 
HANDLING OF EQUIPISENT 
Fai 1 ure o f  packaging , shi ppi ng , and storage provisions t o  
protect pyrotechnics from s t a t i c  charges, impact and shock, 
h i g h  and low temperatures, moisture, and contamination. 
Pyrotechnic c i rcu i t  checks with electr ical  test equipment 
using, o r  containing, power sources h i g h  enough t o  f i r e  
electroexplosive devices. 
PROTECT I ON FRL'M ENV I RONMENT 
Failure o f  pyrotechnic devices due t o  sublimatfon o f  
explosives not  adequately sealed froiii space vacuum. 
Inadequate protection o f  so l i c  propellant rocket motors from 
moisture o r  other contaminants by seals capable of: 
a. 
b. Being expelled during normal rocket ignition without 
Maintaining an internal atmosphere o f  dry nitrogen a t  
pressures above ambi ent. 
damage t o  the nozzle and w i t h o u t  leaving remnants t h a t  
could a l t e r  the normal flow through the nozzle. 
c. Providing access for  inspection o f  the gra in  ( i f  other 
suitable provisions do not  exis t ) .  
Inadequate protection of ends o f  shaped charges and primacord 
from intrusion of moisture o r  expulsion of explosive material 
during vibration and decompression. 
11-1 
11 .o AERODYNAMIC HAZARDS 
11 . l  CON F I  GURAT i ON 
1 1 . 1 . 1  Spacecraft aersdynzmic shapes having stable attitudes that  
are unsafe fcr reentry or parachute deployment. 
12-1 
12.0 
12.1 
12.1.1 
12.1.2 
12.1.3 
12.1.4 
12.1.5 
12.1.6 
12.1.7 
12.1.8 
12.1.9 
12.1.10 
12.1 . l l  
12.1.12 
12.1.13 
OPERATIONAL HAZARDS 
CON F I GURAT I ON 
Inadequate procedures t o  ensure removal of a1 1 nonf 1 i g h t  
equipment prior t o  f l i g h t .  
Allowing primary a t t i tude  indicators t o  be switched t o  
display other than basic f l i g h t  parameters without adequate 
cautions. 
Failure t o  maintain required pressure i n  a system because 
of a comnon pressure source which i s  required t o  supply 
several demands simultaneously. 
Implosion of l i q u i d  tanks as a result of inadequate inflow 
of ullage gas as l i q i ~ i d  is drained under atmuspheric 
pressure. 
Inadequate provisions for controlling or  l i m i t i n g  temperature 
change i n  tanks or  pressure bot t les  duri ng pressurization. 
Unreported design o r  manufacturing changes made i n  production 
components a f t e r  qual i f i  cati  on tes t s .  
Inadequate locking and securing of e lectr ical  connxtors 
and mechani cal fasteners . 
Lack of protection from a i r  intrusion i n t o  purge hydrogen 
sys terns. 
Inadequate bonding and grounding of equipment , pl  umbi ng , and 
f aci 1 i ties used w i  t h  1 i q u i  d hydrogen. 
Lack of explosive vapor detection capability i n  the vicini ty  
of propellant handling operations. 
Failure to  ins ta l l  positive leak-preventing caps or plugs 
on f i l l  and +est ports prior t o  f l i g h t .  
Lack of a single authoritative source of up-to-date 
information on the actual configuration existing i n  the 
stages and interfaces of the vehicle a t  any time. 
High pressure or flamnable f l u i d  lines i n  the vicini ty  of 
welding operations. 
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12.1.14 
12.1.15 
12.1.16 
12.1.17 
12.1.18 
12.1.19 
12.2 
12.2.1 
12.2.2 
12.2.3 
12.2.4 
12.3 
12.3.1 
12.4 
12.4.1 
Lack of distinctive identification on otherwise identical 
switches on the sane panel when incorrect switch selection 
would create a dangerous situation. 
Lack of separate f l u i d  servicing capability for  each module 
of the space vehicle. 
Inadequate provisions for verification of crew v i s i b i l i t y  
required on manned spacecraft missions. 
Failure to  evaluate crew safety impact of changes to  baseline 
configurations (philosophy, hardware, and operations). 
Inaccessibility of emergmcy equipment (e.g., f i r e  
extinguisher and oxygev masks) under a l l  identifiable 
contingencies. 
Lack of guards for  switches that control cr i t ical  functions. 
CONTANINAT ION 
Inadequate protectior! of breathing oxygen systems from 
contami n a t i  on. 
Lack of procedures t o  verify removal of a l l  tools and 
extraneous equipment prior to  closeout for shipment or 
start of tes ts .  
Circulation of ground fluids (coolants, etc.) through space 
vehicle systems. 
Exposes the f l igh t  systems t o  contamination existing 
or  generated i n  ground support equipment. 
Fogging of spacecraft windows by silicone oi l  from room- 
temperature vu1 cani zed compounds not heat cured in vacuum 
before f l ight .  
TOXICITY 
Inadequate method for  the control of radioactive materials 
which may be inadvertently released i n  spacecraft modules. 
HUMAN ERROR 
Reduced work force competence and i 11 -considered 
improvisations t h a t  characterize t ightly schedtlled, multiple 
sh i f t  operations. 
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12.4.2 
12.4.3 
12.4.4 
12.4.5 
12.4.6 
12.4.7 
12.4.8 
12.4.9 
12.4.10 
12.5 
12.5.1 
12.5.2 
12.5.3 
I n s u f f i c i e n t  technical  review o f  planned t e s t  procedures, 
inc lud ing  changes and dev iat ions generated d w i n g  tests .  
Simultaneous tes ts  on the same veh ic le  con t ro l l ed  by 
d i f f e r e n t  groups no t  adequately coordinated. 
Inadequate pro tec t ion  o f  pressure vessels and pressure 1 ines 
from damage by dropped too ls ,  s l i p p i n g  wrenches, d r i l l s ,  o r  
i nco r rec t  s ized b o l t s  and screws. 
Fa i l u re  t o  remove covers o r  seals from overboard dump por ts ,  
p i t o t  and s t a t i c  pressure sensing por ts ,  and pressure 
r e l i e f  vents. 
Inadequate prov is ions fo r  exchange o f  technica l  i n f o m a t i o n  
between s h i f t s  performing a cont inuing tes t .  
I n s u f f i c i e n t  planning and operator t r a i n i n g  and rehearsal 
f o r  foreseeable emergencies. 
Docking wi thout  deact ivat ing incompatible veh ic le  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  systems. 
The change i n  vehScle mass o r  d i f ferences i n  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  system response charac ter is t i cs  i n  
the two vehic les can cause severe o s c i l l a t i o n s  
w i t h  excessive waste o f  con t ro l  system propel lants .  
Overloading o f  spacecraft on board computer by f a i l u r e  t c  
rernave inputs  no t  being used. 
Fa i lu re  t o  fo l low procedures r igorous ly  t h a t  requ i re  a 
c a l l c u t  o f  funct ions t o  be performed and an a f f i rma t i ve  
response t h a t  each func t ion  has been accomplished. 
IMPROPER P hO CE DU RES 
Unnecessarily ea r l y  armin? o f  systems. 
Mating and demating o f  e l e c t r i c a l  connectors w i thout  
removicg voltages f rcw the powered s ide(s)  o f  the connector, 
where the connector has no t  been s p e c i f i c a l l y  designed t o  
t o l e r a t e  t h i s  type o f  operation. 
Unrecognized damage t o  f l i g h t  hardware r e s u l t i n g  from p r i o r  
use i n  t r a i n i n g  exercises. 
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12.5.4 
12.5.5 
12.5.6 
12.5.7 
12.5.8 
12.5.9 
12.5.10 
12.5.11 
12.5.12 
12.5.13 
12.5.14 
12.5.15 
12.5.16 
12.5.17 
Failure t o  verify conipatibility of e lectr ical  i n p u t s  from 
ground equi pment t o  spacecraft sys tetn immedi ately prior t o  
connecting for tes t s .  
Unnecessary delay i n  disarming systems no longer needed. 
Inadequate provisions for obtaining and verifying 
equalization of internal and external pressures prior t o  
opening of hatches o r  pressure systems. 
Check valves w i t h  sof t  seat; subjected t o  higher than 
design pressure different ia ls  d u r i n g  testing. 
Spontaneous i g n i t i o n  of "Pastra-Jell" and aluminum wool 
used in cleaning. 
Use of nonconductive p las t ic  coverings over spacecraft o r  
equipment containing pyrotechnic devices. 
Using metal tools t o  troubleshoot powered-up electronic 
equi pmen t . 
Fai 1 ure t o  maintain an nert gas b l  anket over propel 1 ants 
i n  tanks. 
Fai lure t o  purge l i q u i d  hydrogen systems w i t h  gaseous 
helium pr ior  t o  introduction of l i q u i d  hydrogen. 
Failure to  relieve pressure completely t o  an accurately 
measured level low enough t o  prevent dangerous motions or 
sprays when systems are opened. 
Use of halogenated hydrocarbon solvents t o  clean n i  trogerl 
tetroxide systems (e.g., Trichorethylene cleaning f lu id) .  
Fai 1 ure t o  verify operational readiness of safety systems. 
Failure t o  obtain a f inal  end-to-end check of space 
vehicle control and s tabi l izat ion systems in the ?aunch 
con f i gurati on. 
Overstressing of f l i gh t  a r t i c l e s  in testing. 
verify safety of a planned t e s t  on a f l i g h t  a r t i c l e  by 
prior t e s t s  on a prototype. 
Failure t o  
12-5 
12.5.18 
12.5.19 
12.5.20 
12.5.21 
12.5.22 
12.5.23 
12.5.24 
12.5.25 
12.5.26 
12.5.27 
12.5.28 
Failure t o  require a detailed reverification o f  c i r cu i t  
and component ccndi tion a f t e r  an inadvertent overvoltage, 
polarity reversal o r  connector disconnect. 
Overheating o f  solenoid valves i n  ground tests (dry). 
Uncalibrated pressure re l ie f  devices. 
Failure t o  maintain historical  records of e lectr ical  
signature t e s t s  on c r i t i ca l  solenoid valves. 
Propellant loading procedures that  permit periods of time 
when propellant i n  the spacecraft propellant tanks is  under 
greater pressure than that  existing in the spacecraft gas 
manifold system. 
Even though system leak checks are made prior t o  
loading, there is a possibi l i ty  o f  propellant leakage 
i n t o  the spacecraft plumbing. 
system i s  activated i n  f l i g h t  the leaked propellant 
can freeze and interfere  w i t h  operation o f  the 
pressurization system or  can be forced into the 
opposite propellant tanks, when oxidizer and fuel 
tanks have a common pressurization system. 
When the pressurization 
Working on 1 i ve e lec t r i  cal equipment near pressure 1 i nes 
or  tanks containing hazardous f 1 uids  or h i  gh pressures. 
A short  c i r cu i t  from hot wires through metal tools 
t o  grounded pressure l ines or  tanks can cau:e rupture 
and ign i t ion  of f lu id  sprays. 
Entering t anks  or confined spaces without protective 
equipment and procedures. 
Excessive or uncontrolled cycling o r  operation of limited 
l i fe lcyc le  f l i g h t  hardware which could cause i n f l i g h t  
fa i  lure because of wear-out. 
Lack cf rigorous housekeeping procedures which prevent 
accumulation of flammable materials outside stowage 
containers. 
Use o f  malfunction procedures which place crewmen i n  an 
unsafe posture. 
Crew timelines w h i c h  do no t  provide adequate time t o  
accomplish an operation or ser ies  o f  ac t iv i t ies .  
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12.5.29 Inadequate requirements and procedures for  retesting 
systems a f t e r  changes. 
12.5.30 Failure t o  provide rapid response postfl ight safing team, 
under a single ac t iv i t i e s  manager, consisting of: 
(1 ) Personnel w i t h  detai led sys tern knowledge, an 
understanding of safety requirements, and capable of 
making sound, on-the-spot, decisions. 
(2) Detailed, preplanned procedures for  accomplishing 
both nominal and contingency postfl ight safing. 
(3) A full  complement of operational and protective GSE 
f o r  preformi ng nominal and conti ngency saf i ng 
operations . 
12.6 
12.6.1 
12.7 
12.7.1 
12.7.2 
HANDLING OF EQUIPMENT 
Inadequate procedures for  hand1 i Irg and transferring 
hazardous fluids or materials i n  a pressurized area. 
OPE RAT IONAL STATUS I N FORMATI ON 
Failure to provide iin equipment merator  w i t h  an immediate 
and positive indication of system response to  his control 
actions . 
Means not provided t o  verify the integri ty  of a docking 
hatch seal before separating a docked module or  vehicle. 
